While increasing the number of donors, standard matching has been shown to cause considerable crowding out (Eckel and Grossman, 2003, Karlan and List, 2007, or Huck and Rasul, 2011). Can we design an alternative matching scheme that would lead to an increase in the values of gifts given? We propose a form of a threshold matching that matches any donation above a certain threshold with a fixed amount. First, we study how such thresholds should be chosen depending on past donations. We find that asking for less than the amount given in the past results in lower donations and lower revenue. Asking for the amount given in the past or a higher amount increases donations with a threshold of 60-75% higher than the past donation being optimal. However, while asking for less result in high compliance, asking for more also triggers some contrarian behavior. Second, we study how to use such personalized matching for prospective donors based on observable characteristics. Finally, we compare personalized threshold matching to a non-personalized version with the same threshold for all participants. In the sample of previous non-donors, higher threshold results in lower response rate, higher average donation, and lower return per mail-out.