We jointly investigate last place and rank reversal aversion, two mechanisms potentially weakening support for redistributive policies, to disentangle their effects. While (rank-dependent) rank reversal aversion nests last place aversion, that ranks are inverted is not a necessary condition to find oneself in the last place. Moreover, while last place aversion affects individuals close to the bottom of the distribution, rank reversal aversion might bite in all income brackets. We shed light on a potential reason for the failed replication of previous results on this topic, and discuss it in light of the literature on replicability of experimental results: After introducing a small change in the design, our data indicates that both mechanisms drive subjects’ behaviours. We find evidence for rank reversal aversion (independent of rank) having the strongest impact on subjects’ behaviour, in addition to pure last place aversion. We discuss implications for policy design from both the public finance and management science perspectives.