Prosociality is defined as voluntary behavior intended to benefit another. When prosocial behavior comes at a cost and without immediate advantage for the actors, the classical rational choice theory (RCT) using the assumption of materialistic egoism predicts that prosocial behavior will not occur. However, a plethora of experimental investigations shows a completely different picture. Although the use of social instead of egoistic preferences can resolve some of the differences between prediction and observation, still a number of systematic deviations, such as framing effects, cannot be adequately explained.

One promising approach to close this gap comes from the dual process theories (DPT), according to which the RCT represents only one of two ideal-typical variants of human decision-making behavior. In contrast to rational considerations, actors might choose actions via an intuitive decision-making system. Whether actors make their decision via the rational or the intuitive system depends on individual as well as on situational characteristics. Hence, RCT is only a special case of DPT and in order to be an improvement over the simpler RCT any application of the DPT must meet two crucial criteria: First, it must reliably predict whether actors will choose their actions via the rational or the intuitive system and, second, it must tell us what the intuitive action will be.

For this reason, we present experimental evidence on the situational conditions for prosocial behavior. In our work, we systematically vary the situational factors that, according to the most common variants of the DPT, should have an impact on the decision-making process as well as on the decision itself, such as time constraints or framing of the situation. With this research we contribute to the empirical assessment of the predictive value of DPT in the context of prosocial behavior.