The interaction of culture and institutions is of great relevance for social and economic interactions. Specific cultural trajectories in different societies (that base on different histories) can influence the adoption and success of (newly installed) institutions. Identifying causality between culture and institutions, however, is difficult with field data. To investigate the role of culture on the (acceptance and) prevalence of sanctioning institutions, we conduct a series of controlled lab experiments in two countries with different cultural trajectories: Germany and Turkey. If imposed exogenously, an institution with individual sanctioning opportunities performs well in establishing cooperation in Germany, but less so in Turkey. If the same sanctioning institution is one of two alternatives that people can freely choose in an endogenous choice setting, then the sanctioning institution is the clear winner against a non-sanctioning institution, in Germany, as well as in Turkey. Though we find differences in people's initial institutional preferences and contribution behaviors, the dynamics of institution choice and both the evolution of contributions and sanctioning behaviors are remarkably similar in both countries.