The volunteer’s dilemma (VOD) is a step-level collective goods game in which the contribution of one individual is necessary and sufficient to provide a benefit for the entire group. Doing the dishes after a flat-share dinner, calling the police if someone disturbs everybody’s sleep, vetoing an unpopular motion in a committee meeting, are all situations that can be conceived as VODs.

We investigate how small groups tacitly coordinate in the VOD and thereby develop latent norms. Latent norms are behavioral regularities that emerge over time when members of a group react to each other’s actions. There are two types of latent norms that are often observed in the repeated VOD: turn-taking, by which group members take turns in providing the public good, and single volunteering, by which the same group member provides the public good repeatedly while others free-ride. Both latent norms can lead to collective efficiency, but turn-taking leads to equal payoffs between group members while single volunteering leads to unequal payoffs

In two experiments, we address the question whether the latent norms we observe are determined by group members’ other-regarding preferences, or whether they are a result of the structural properties of the VOD. To answer this question, we measured subjects’ other-regarding preferences and varied the asymmetry of the VOD experimentally. We manipulated two types of asymmetry: payoff asymmetry and focality. In a VOD with payoff asymmetry, one of the group members has lower (or higher) costs of producing the public good. Focality is established by singling out one group member with an arbitrary visual cue. Both types of asymmetries might help groups to coordinate on the latent norm of single volunteering, by letting the odd one out volunteer repeatedly.

In our first experiment, we test the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences promote tacit coordination on turn-taking in the symmetric VOD (as this leads to equal earnings over time), but hamper coordination on single volunteering by the member with the lowest costs in the asymmetric VOD. In our second experiment we test the hypothesis that singling out one group member by an arbitrary visual cue is sufficient to bring about single volunteering by the focal group member, even if the VOD payoffs are symmetric.

We find that the structural properties of the VOD have a larger bearing on what type of latent norm emerges than group members’ other-regarding preferences. In the symmetric VOD, the large majority of groups develop a latent norm of turn-taking. However, the relation between asymmetry and the latent norms that emerge is not clear-cut. If there is one group member with lower costs, single volunteering by this member is coordinated on by most groups. However, single volunteering rarely develops if there is one member with higher costs. Likewise, when payoffs are symmetric, but there is one focal player, the variation in types of latent norms that emerge is larger, and few groups coordinate on single volunteering.