In this study, I analyze the results of a principal-agent experiment, where (i) agents can cause positive as well as negative externalities on behalf of their principals, and where (ii) effort is a partial substitute for negative externalities. Externalities are modeled as an increase or decrease in a charitable payment. The results suggest a fundamentally asymmetric response with agents being reluctant to donate on behalf of the principal, yet on average willing to increase the payoff of the principal at the expense of the charity. Agents with higher social value orientation provide more effort and take less from the charity, such that principals earn higher payoffs. However, agents who fully renounce damages produce significantly lower payoffs for principals than agents who are willing to cause maximum damages, irrespective of whether or not the principals’ profit targets required damages. Finally, agents who refuse to take from the charity generate the largest economic surplus. This points to a fundamental incentive problem and contradicts the neoclassical claim that the economic surplus is maximized when agents maximize shareholder wealth.