14:00 - 15:30
Contracts and mechanisms
Parallel track
Room: Sterrenkamer
Th-Contracts and mechanisms-1
Robbing Peter to pay Paul? Delegation contracts and social spillovers
Wiebke Szymczak
Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom
Th-Contracts and mechanisms-2
Tracking and teamwork performance
Florian Auferoth 1, Björn Eskofier 2, Veronika Grimm 1, Robert Richer 2, Nicolas Rohleder 3, 4
1 Chair of Economic Theory Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Nürnberg, Germany, 2 Pattern Recognition Lab, Department of Computer Science Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany, Erlangen, Germany, 3 Department of Psychology and Sports Science Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany, 4 Department of Psychology Brandeis University, MA 02453, United States
Th-Contracts and mechanisms-3
Regulating a Duopoly by a Pretend-But-Perform Mechanism: An Experimental Study
Onur Dogan 3, Ayca Ebru Giritligil 1, 2, Nedim Okan 1, 2
1 Bilgi Economics Lab of Istanbul, Istanbul, Turkey, 2 Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey, 3 Altinbas University, Istanbul, Turkey
Th-Contracts and mechanisms-4
How do different compensation schemes effect individuals’ flood insurance decision? – Evidence from a lab and an online experiment
Christiane Reif, Daniel Osberghaus
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany